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NOTES 
STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RIGHTS:  HOW 
MUCH SHOULD THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
INFLUENCE? 
Kendra Kumor* 
 
This Note is about state court interpretation of state constitutional 
provisions that relate to prosecutorial summation arguments.  This Note 
finds that when the U.S. Supreme Court rules on a prosecutorial summation 
issue, state court interpretations of their state constitutional provisions are 
less diverse than when the Supreme Court does not issue an opinion.  When 
state courts interpret their own constitutional provisions after Supreme 
Court precedent has been disseminated, they give more interpretative weight 
to the Supreme Court opinion than any other sister state precedent.  This 
Note uses prosecutorial summation arguments to illustrate why state courts 
should refrain from placing greater interpretive weight on Supreme Court 
precedent when interpreting their state constitutions, since state courts have 
more expertise and authority in the area of state criminal trial procedure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
State court criminal defendants derive their rights from both the U.S. 
Constitution and the constitutions of their states.1  Sometimes the language 
of the federal and state constitutions is identical, and other times the language 
differs significantly.2  In either case, the rights that defendants derive from 
 
 1. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 
VA. L. REV. 389, 392 (1998). 
 2. For example, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, in part:  “No person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. V.  The counterpart in the Maryland Declaration of Rights, at article 24, reads:  “That 
no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or 
outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, 
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these two constitutional sources are usually the same, despite differing 
language or differing drafter intentions.3  Yet, the American judiciary has 
explicitly rejected the idea of state constitutional universalism,4 and the 
balance between the federal judiciary and state judiciary is still biased toward 
the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court.5 
Before the Supreme Court’s selective incorporation6 of the federal Bill of 
Rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the only 
individual rights at the state level were derived from state constitutions.7  The 
movement known as “New Judicial Federalism” is thus viewed as a 
rediscovery of these state constitutional rights beginning in the 1970s after 
most of the Bill of Rights had been incorporated.8  Although New Judicial 
Federalism sought to shift the focus of individual rights back to the state 
constitutions as alternative or additional sources of individual rights, “state 
courts generally do not blaze their own trails but instead follow the federal 
lead.”9  This federal bias is illustrated by the fact that when the Supreme 
Court rules on an issue, most state courts conform to this precedent when 
interpreting state constitutions, but when the Supreme Court does not rule on 
an issue, state courts vary much more when interpreting state constitutions.10 
Although this pattern is evident in the state courts’ holdings, the opinions 
do not explicitly acknowledge or explain why state courts appear to be 
compelled to follow federal precedent when interpreting their own 
constitutions.11  Regardless of the reasons state courts may feel compelled to 
follow the holdings of the Supreme Court, there are several federalist 
considerations and values that demand state courts give the Supreme Court 
no more persuasive weight than the reasoning of their sister state courts. 
Prosecutorial summation issues involve various rights of defendants and 
duties of prosecutors as state actors.  These issues are particularly murky, as 
 
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS art. XXIV. 
 3. See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 390–91. 
 4. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); see also JAMES 
A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS:  A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 30–31 (2005) (defining constitutional universalism as “the belief that all 
American constitutions are drawn from the same set of universal principles of constitutional 
self-governance”). 
 5. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction:  A Federal 
Judge’s Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORD. 
557, 557–58. 
 6. Since the U.S. Bill of Rights was only originally intended to protect the enumerated 
rights from federal government interference, the Supreme Court, over several decades, 
“selectively incorporated” certain rights to be protected from state government interference as 
well. THOMAS C. MARKS JR. & JOHN F. COOPER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 
34–35 (2d ed. 2003). 
 7. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113 (2009). 
 8. Id. at 113–14. 
 9. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 390–91. 
 10. See infra Part I.A; see also JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS:  STATES 
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174–75 (2018) (describing the pattern 
of state court “lockstepping” with federal precedent). 
 11. See infra Part I.B; see also GARDNER, supra note 4, at 12. 
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they often involve balancing the rights of the accused with the duties of the 
state.12  This Note focuses on the constitutional issues surrounding 
prosecutorial summation arguments in particular because of their potential to 
elicit a range of judicial considerations at the federal, state, and local levels.  
An analysis of a different area of criminal trial procedure could produce 
different judicial patterns and conclusions. 
Part I of this Note will illustrate that, since the Supreme Court rarely opines 
on prosecutorial summation issues, significant variation in state court 
interpretations of their constitutional provisions is the norm, but when the 
Supreme Court does rule on a prosecutorial summation issue, such as in 
Portuondo v. Agard13 and United States v. Robinson,14 state courts conform 
to those rulings without individual analysis of the states’ constitutional 
language.  Part II explores the competing considerations underlying why 
state court judges may feel compelled to conform to or diverge from Supreme 
Court precedent.  Finally, Part III will argue that, although state courts may 
conform to federal precedent for valid reasons, there are several overriding 
reasons why they should refrain from overemphasizing Supreme Court 
precedent, especially in the context of prosecutorial summation issues. 
I.  STATE COURT BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO U.S. SUPREME COURT 
RULINGS ON PROSECUTORIAL SUMMATION ISSUES 
Two general patterns emerge when analyzing the relationship between 
federal and state court precedent.  First, if the Supreme Court does not 
promulgate a ruling, state court interpretations are varied.15  Second, when 
the Supreme Court does promulgate a ruling, state courts often conform to 
that precedent.16  This part uses specific prosecutorial summation issues and 
cases to illustrate these two patterns of state court behavior. 
A.  No Supreme Court Ruling:  State Court Variation as the Norm  
The Supreme Court receives between 7000 and 8000 petitions for 
certiorari each term.17  The Court only grants review with oral arguments by 
attorneys in about eighty of these cases.18  Of these cases,19 only a fraction 
 
 12. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506–07 (1983) (stating the Court’s 
analysis of prosecutorial conduct must “balanc[e] the interests involved”). 
 13. 529 U.S. 61 (2000) (holding that when a defendant takes the stand, a prosecutor may 
always discredit the defendant on summation by arguing the defendant tailored testimony to 
the evidence presented at trial). 
 14. 485 U.S. 25 (1988) (holding that a prosecutor’s summation comments that the 
defendant could have taken the stand and explained his side of the story did not violate his 
Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination, since the remarks fairly 
responded to defense counsel’s summation). 
 15. Infra Part I.A. 
 16. Infra Part I.B. 
 17. The Supreme Court at Work:  The Term and Caseload, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/courtatwork.aspx [https://perma.cc/5LVF-M2TR] (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. 
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deal with state criminal trial procedure and an even smaller fraction deal with 
prosecutorial summation rules in particular.20  Thus, of the vast majority of 
prosecutorial summation issues that may arise, the Supreme Court has 
directly addressed only a handful.  This section provides examples of state 
court behavior when, as is the norm, the Supreme Court does not rule on a 
particular prosecutorial summation issue.  The examples show that state court 
variation on prosecutorial summation issues is typical state court behavior. 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of a prosecutor’s 
use of a personal opinion about the defendant’s guilt in summation 
arguments.21  Thus, states vary in their rules on the use of personal opinion 
as to defendants’ guilt in prosecutorial summation speeches.22  Nineteen 
states find that any use of personal opinion in summation arguments is 
improper.23  Twenty-eight states find that use of a prosecutor’s personal 
opinion regarding a defendant’s guilt in summation arguments is proper only 
if it is supported by the evidence.24  Four other states still have unsettled law 
on this issue.25 
When state courts do not have Supreme Court precedent to use as 
guidance, they look to other sources of legal authority, such as sister state 
courts or American Bar Association (ABA) rules and guidelines.  For 
example, the Supreme Court of Alabama used language from the New York 
and Michigan courts to justify its ruling that it is never proper for prosecutors 
to state their personal beliefs as to the guilt of the accused in argument.26  The 
Alabama Supreme Court further bolstered this reasoning by using Canons 
Five and Fifteen of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.27  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court also cites to dozens of state court cases in coming to 
the conclusion that prosecutorial summation remarks regarding the 
 
 20. For example, in the 2018 term, the Supreme Court considered seventy-two cases and 
only four of those cases concerned state criminal trial procedure. See SCOTUS Statistics, 
HARV. L. REV., https://harvardlawreview.org/supreme-court-statistics [https://perma.cc/ 
Z5CF-UWP7] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 21. In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1985), the Court touched on this issue but 
limited its ruling to whether or not the prosecutor’s personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt 
amounted to plain error, not whether the prosecutor’s comments were inappropriate as the 
lower courts had previously determined. 
 22. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Prosecutor’s 
Argument to Jury Indicating His Belief or Knowledge as to Guilt of Accused—Modern State 
Cases, 88 A.L.R.3d 449 (1978). 
 23. See id.  Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, District of 
Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, 
New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. 
 24. See id.  Those states are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. 
 25. See id.  Those states are Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Vermont. Id. 
 26. Adams v. State, 198 So. 2d 255, 257 (Ala. 1967). 
 27. Id.  Canon Five of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics states, “The primary duty 
of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done.” 
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).  Canon Fifteen states, “It is 
improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client’s innocence or in 
the justice of his cause.” Id. Canon 15. 
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prosecutor’s personal opinion are impermissible unless evidence supports the 
opinion.28  The North Dakota Supreme Court also uses the ABA Canons and 
a treatise on criminal procedure to justify its position.29  The Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals also weighed various sister state court rulings 
extensively when considering its formulation of a rule on prosecutorial use 
of personal opinion in summation remarks.30  After describing in detail no 
less than nine other state court holdings, the Oklahoma court concluded, 
“[w]e could fill a volume of quotations to the same effect from both 
American and English reports, but deem these sufficient” to support the 
ruling that prosecutors may not use personal opinion in summation 
arguments unless the evidence supports such an opinion.31 
On the other hand, some courts solely rely on their own authority in 
promulgating rules on prosecutorial summation issues.  For example, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court did not cite a single authority in holding that a 
prosecutor is “never justified in thrusting his personality into the case, and 
expressing his opinion that the defendant is guilty.”32  The Arizona Supreme 
Court cited only itself in cases with parallel, yet not controlling, facts dealing 
with prosecutorial summations before concluding, “[i]n our state the 
prosecuting attorney should not in his argument . . . submit his personal 
opinion.”33 
State courts do not give much weight to lower federal courts’ rulings on 
this prosecutorial summation issue.  Even though nearly every circuit court 
has ruled on this issue, the state courts in each circuit are still split on when 
allowing personal opinions in prosecutorial summation arguments is 
improper.34  For example, the Second Circuit is comprised of Vermont, New 
York, and Connecticut.35  In United States v. Carr,36 the Second Circuit held 
that a prosecutor’s personal views are altogether prohibited in summation 
arguments.37  Yet, Vermont’s case law on this issue is still unsettled,38 while 
 
 28. State v. Gunderson, 144 N.W. 659, 660 (N.D. 1913) (holding the following 
prosecutorial remarks were impermissible statements of personal opinion:  “I do not come 
here to try a case unless the defendant is guilty”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Williams v. State, 114 P. 1114, 1119–22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910). 
 31. Id. at 1122. 
 32. State v. Clark, 131 N.W. 369, 370 (Minn. 1911). 
 33. State v. Titus, 152 P.2d 129, 131 (Ariz. 1944). 
 34. See generally United States v. Miller, 799 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States 
v. Thompson, 482 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 
1076 (9th Cir. 2002); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Renfro, 600 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1979). 
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 41. 
 36. 424 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 37. Id. at 227. 
 38. See State v. Parker, 162 A. 696, 699 (Vt. 1932) (citing with approval cases that express 
the view that prosecutors’ personal opinions are always prohibited and also cases that express 
the view that prosecutors’ personal opinions are permitted if based on the evidence presented 
at trial). 
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New York39 and Connecticut40 follow this ruling.  Additionally, the Fifth 
Circuit is comprised of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi;41 Texas42 and 
Louisiana43 case law is still unsettled on this issue, even though the Fifth 
Circuit has ruled that prosecutors may not express their personal opinions 
unless their opinions are based on the evidence.44  Mississippi follows the 
Fifth Circuit’s logic.45  Although the above analysis encompasses only one 
prosecutorial summation issue, it is generally illustrative of state court 
behavior when the Supreme Court has not promulgated a ruling.46 
B.  Supreme Court Ruling:  More Uniform State Court Opinions  
Although it is relatively uncommon, the Supreme Court has opined on 
several prosecutorial summation issues.47  When the Supreme Court does 
promulgate a ruling, the state courts behave differently than when no 
Supreme Court precedent exists.  This section demonstrates that when the 
Supreme Court does rule on a prosecutorial summation issue, the state courts 
often conform to the federal precedent.  Through two Supreme Court cases 
and corresponding state court opinions, this section illustrates the powerful 
influence federal precedent has on shaping state court constitutional 
interpretations regarding prosecutorial summation issues. 
 
 39. People v. Lovello, 136 N.E.2d 483, 484 (N.Y. 1956). 
 40. Jenkins v. Comm’r of Corr., 726 A.2d 657, 665 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). 
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 41. 
 42. Compare Clayton v. State, 502 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding a 
prosecutor’s argument that he was not paid enough to prosecute defendants whom he did not 
know to be guilty was improper), with Shipp v. State, 482 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1972) (holding a prosecutor’s argument that “[i]t has been my experience that the stronger the 
State’s case is we bring you, the more desperate and more ridiculous the defenses are,” was a 
permissible comment). 
 43. Compare State v. Landry, 262 So. 2d 360, 362 (La. 1972) (holding the prosecutor’s 
personal interpretation of the facts was permissible because his comments did not imply 
personal knowledge of the facts), with State v. Kaufman, 304 So. 2d 300, 307 (La. 1974) 
(holding the prosecutor’s personal opinion is only permitted in summation if it is clear to the 
jury his opinion is solely based on the evidence presented at trial). 
 44. United States v. Thompson, 482 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 45. Long v. State, 141 So. 591, 594 (Miss. 1932). 
 46. See J. Evans, Annotation, Comment or Argument by Court or Counsel that 
Prosecution Evidence Is Uncontradicted as Amounting to Improper Reference to Accused’s 
Failure to Testify, 14 A.L.R.3d 723 (1967) (detailing varied state rulings in criminal cases 
where prosecutors comment that their evidence is uncontradicted); William B. Johnson, 
Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Comments by Counsel Vouching for 
Credibility of Witness—State Cases, 45 A.L.R.4th 602 (1986) (detailing varied state rulings 
in criminal cases where prosecutors comment on the credibility of law enforcement officials 
as witnesses). 
 47. See generally United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding prosecutor’s 
remarks regarding his personal opinion of defendant’s guilt did not amount to plain error); 
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (holding that when a court considers if a 
prosecutor’s reference to the defendants’ failure to testify requires reversal, the court must 
consider if it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty 
verdict); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (holding a prosecutor’s ambiguous 
remark about the defendant’s guilt was improper but mitigated by a curative instruction). 
938 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
1.  Portuondo v. Agard 
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors may always argue defendants 
tailored their testimony to the evidence presented at trial, no matter how little 
evidence prosecutors may have to support this argument.48  After the 
Supreme Court so held, most state courts interpreted state constitutional 
provisions in line with this ruling.49  Only five states have interpreted their 
state constitutions differently than the Supreme Court interpreted the U.S. 
Constitution in this case.50  Four of those states followed the dissenting 
opinion of the case,51 and only one state promulgated a holding that no 
Supreme Court Justice stated.52 
In 2000, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in Agard.53  The 
Court granted certiorari after the Second Circuit held that a prosecutor’s 
summation remarks violated the respondent’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.54  At trial, the prosecutor said, “You know, ladies and 
gentlemen, unlike all the other witnesses in this case the defendant has a 
benefit and the benefit that he has, unlike all the other witnesses, is he gets to 
sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he 
testifies.”55 
Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned that the 
prosecutor’s comments concerned the respondent’s credibility as a witness 
and were therefore in line with the long-standing doctrine that when a 
defendant voluntarily assumes the role of a witness, the defendant’s 
credibility may be impeached.56  Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the 
comments’ generic nature made them unconstitutional.57  The majority 
reasoned that the comments “simply set forth a consideration the jury was to 
have in mind when assessing the defendant’s credibility,” which prior case 
law supported.58 
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the concurring opinion, in which he 
agreed the prosecutor’s summation likely did not meet the high threshold of 
a serious trial error but nonetheless stated that comments of that type “should 
be discouraged rather than validated.”59  Justice Stevens explicitly noted that 
state courts and trial judges have the power to create their own rules about 
this type of comment in prosecutorial summation speeches, despite the 
Court’s ruling in this case.60 
 
 48. See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 69 (2000). 
 49. See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
 50. See infra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. 
 51. See infra notes 71–89 and accompanying text. 
 52. See infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 53. 529 U.S. 61 (2000). 
 54. Id. at 65. 
 55. Id. at 64. 
 56. Id. at 69 (citing Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958)). 
 57. Id. at 70–71. 
 58. Id. at 71. 
 59. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. 
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg voiced strong 
opposition to the majority’s ruling:  “The Court today transforms a 
defendant’s presence at trial from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic 
burden on his credibility.”61  The dissent agreed with the Second Circuit’s 
prohibition on generic tailoring accusations and allowance of specific 
arguments about the fit between the defendant’s testimony and other 
witnesses’ testimony.62 
Despite Justice Stevens’s call for state courts to independently interpret 
prosecutorial summation speech rules (especially regarding a prosecutor’s 
emphasis on a defendant’s presence at trial),63 only five states have expanded 
on this federal precedent, and only one has used its state constitution to do 
so.64  The five states are Colorado,65 Hawaii,66 Massachusetts,67 
Minnesota,68 and New Jersey,69 with Hawaii being the only state to rely on 
its state constitution.70  All other states with opinions on this issue have 
conformed to the Supreme Court’s holding. 
Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Minnesota have all held that 
prosecutors’ generic tailoring arguments on summation are prohibited, but 
prosecutors’ specific tailoring arguments on summation are permitted.71  
These states all conform to the reasoning provided in Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion in Agard.72  In State v. Mattson,73 the Supreme Court of 
the State of Hawaii explicitly stated it was “persuaded by the reasoning of 
the Portuondo dissent.”74  The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the 
confrontation clause in article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution is 
broader than the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.75  
Hawaii’s confrontation clause prohibits generic tailoring arguments because 
they “burden the defendant’s constitutional right to be present at trial” and 
“discourage a defendant from exercising his constitutional right to testify on 
his own behalf.”76 
The Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Colorado courts followed the holding 
of the Agard dissent but held as such using their supervisory authority instead 
of their state constitutional interpretation authority.77  In Commonwealth v. 
 
 61. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 88. 
 63. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 64. State v. Mattson, 226 P.3d 482 (Haw. 2010). 
 65. People v. Martinez, 224 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2009). 
 66. Mattson, 226 P.3d 482. 
 67. Commonwealth v. Gaudette, 808 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 2004). 
 68. State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 2006). 
 69. State v. Daniels, 861 A.2d 808 (N.J. 2004). 
 70. Mattson, 226 P.3d at 496. 
 71. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 72. See People v. Martinez, 224 P.3d 1026, 1037 (Colo. App. 2009); Mattson, 226 P.3d 
at 496; Gaudette, 808 N.E.2d at 802; Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 657–58. 
 73. 226 P.3d 482 (Haw. 2010). 
 74. Id. at 496. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing state courts’ inherent supervisory power). 
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Gaudette,78 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that it is 
impermissible for a prosecutor to make tailoring arguments on summation, 
“unless there is evidence introduced at trial to support that argument.”79  
However, the Massachusetts Supreme Court did not make this ruling based 
on state constitutional language.80  It promulgated this holding based on prior 
case law, predating the Supreme Court’s ruling in Agard, which held this 
type of summation argument was prejudicial, and the court explicitly 
declined to consider any state constitutional violation argument.81 
In State v. Swanson,82 the Minnesota Supreme Court, noting Justice 
Stevens’s concurrence encouraging state courts to consider the question 
independently as a matter of state law,83 echoed the Massachusetts court’s 
approach.84  It held that “although not constitutionally required, the better 
rule” is prohibiting generic tailoring and allowing specific tailoring in 
prosecutorial summation arguments.85 
In People v. Martinez,86 the Colorado Court of Appeals explicitly agreed 
with Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Agard and opined that generic 
tailoring arguments defeat the truth-seeking function of the trial process and 
ignore the constitutional presumption of innocence.87  The court concluded 
that the defendant “ha[d] not given [it] a persuasive reason for concluding 
the Colorado Constitution offers protection to a defendant . . . independent 
of and supplemental to the protections provided by the United States 
Constitution.”88  Nevertheless, the court held that “pursuant to [its] 
supervisory authority,” generic tailoring arguments on summation are 
prohibited, while specific tailoring arguments are permitted.89 
New Jersey is the only state that did not completely conform to Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent in Agard.  It expanded the dissent’s logic, holding that 
generic tailoring arguments during summation are always prohibited and 
specific tailoring arguments are permitted “but in a limited fashion.”90  Like 
the state courts mentioned above, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found 
that specific tailoring arguments must be based on the evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom but under no circumstances can the 
prosecutor explicitly refer to the defendant’s presence at court or ability to 
hear other witnesses’ testimony.91  The New Jersey court also based its 
 
 78. 808 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 2004). 
 79. Id. at 802. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Person, 508 N.E.2d 88, 90–91 (Mass. 1987)). 
 82. 707 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 2006). 
 83. Id. at 657. 
 84. Id. at 658 n.2 (citing Gaudette, 808 N.E.2d at 801–03). 
 85. Id. at 657–58. 
 86. 224 P.3d 1026 (Colo. App. 2009). 
 87. Id. at 1036. 
 88. Id. at 1035–36. 
 89. Id. at 1036. 
 90. State v. Daniels, 861 A.2d 808, 819 (N.J. 2004). 
 91. Id. 
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holding on its supervisory authority, instead of its state constitutional 
interpretation authority.92 
As for the vast majority of states that followed the Supreme Court’s Agard 
ruling, the state courts’ language shows there is a perceived higher persuasive 
bar to convince state courts to interpret state constitutions and rules 
differently than the Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution.93  Even 
where the state constitutional language is different from the federal 
constitutional language, state courts still construe the state constitutional 
provision at issue to be identical to the relevant federal provision, using 
federal precedent to support the analysis.94 
For example, in People v. Swift,95 the New York Court of Appeals 
disposed of a defendant’s claim in one dismissive sentence, concluding 
“there is no basis upon which to reach a different result as a matter of State 
constitutional law.”96  The court made no mention of the differences between 
the federal constitutional language on which Agard was based and the New 
York state constitutional language that would have been at issue there.97 
In State v. Bauer,98 the Iowa Court of Appeals used similar conclusory 
language to dispose of a defendant’s claims.  “[W]e see no reason to deviate 
from the persuasive reasoning and holding of the Court in Portuondo on this 
issue, which is in accord with Iowa law and has been previously relied on by 
this court.”99  The court did not provide any further justification for its refusal 
to analyze the language of the Iowa Constitution with respect to this claim.100 
In addressing its decision to refrain from using its supervisory authority in 
this instance, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated, “this court’s 
supervisory authority is to be ‘sparingly exercised’ . . . and we have been 
given no sound reason to exercise it in this context.”101  These dismissive 
statements fill state court decisions, “suggesting that state courts . . . have 
little interest in engaging in intensive and independent interpretation of their 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See infra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
 94. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 6–8. 
 95. 708 N.Y.S.2d 611 (App. Div. 2000). 
 96. Id. at 611. 
 97. Section 6 of the New York Bill of Rights provides, in part:  “In any trial in any court 
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel 
as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be 
confronted with the witnesses against him or her.” N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. 
 98. No. 16-0265, 2017 WL 3067346 (Iowa Ct. App. July 19, 2017). 
 99. Id. at *4. 
 100. See id.  The Iowa Constitution pertaining to the rights of the accused also differs from 
the language of the U.S. Constitution: 
In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of an 
individual the accused shall have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
jury; to be informed of the accusation against him, to have a copy of the same when 
demanded; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for his witnesses; and, to have the assistance of counsel. 
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 101. Teoume-Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478, 495 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Watkins 
v. United States, 846 A.2d 293, 300 (D.C. 2004)). 
942 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
state constitutions,” when Supreme Court precedent has been promulgated 
on this prosecutorial summation issue.102 
2.  United States v. Robinson 
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors may explicitly a reference 
defendant’s failure to take the stand if the comments are in fair response to 
defense counsel’s remarks.103  After the Supreme Court created this narrow 
exception to the Fifth Amendment, most state courts interpreted their Fifth 
Amendment counterparts in the same way.104  Only three states have 
modified their respective constitutional interpretations from this federal 
precedent.105 
In 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated its ruling in Robinson, holding 
that no Fifth Amendment violation occurred when a prosecutor, in closing 
arguments, commented on the defendant’s choice not to testify at trial, where 
the comments responded to the defense counsel’s closing remarks.106  The 
Sixth Circuit was reversed, having held that the prosecutor’s comments 
deprived the defendant of a fair trial because the reference to the defendant’s 
failure to testify was “direct,” so it did not matter that the prosecutor’s 
remarks were responding to defense counsel’s remarks.107  This Supreme 
Court ruling effectively created a general exception to the blanket 
constitutional prohibition on using a defendant’s silence against him.108 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that, 
because the prosecutor’s comments referred only to the “possibility of 
testifying as one of several opportunities which the defendant was 
afforded . . . to explain his side of the case” and the prosecutor’s comments 
did not suggest to the jury that the defendant’s silence was substantive 
evidence of guilt, no Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination was violated.109  The Court explicitly rejected the Sixth 
Circuit’s method of examining whether the comment was a direct or indirect 
reference to the defendant’s failure to testify.110  The Fifth Amendment 
cannot be used as “a sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate comment 
by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the defense case.”111  When a 
prosecutor’s remarks are a fair response to defense counsel’s claim, reference 
to the defendant’s silence is constitutional.112 
 
 102. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 12. 
 103. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 25 (1988). 
 104. See infra notes 128–34 and accompanying text. 
 105. See infra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. 
 106. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 25. 
 107. Id. at 29. 
 108. See id. at 31. 
 109. Id. at 32. 
 110. Id. at 31–32. 
 111. Id. at 32 (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 515 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
 112. Id. 
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Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing the dissenting opinion, reasoned that 
although the majority only carved out a small exception to the bright-line rule 
that prosecutors may not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, this 
modification is nonetheless “unsettling and unwarranted.”113  In his view, the 
exception goes against the plain language of the constitutional standard.114  
Justice Marshall argues that the majority’s language, providing that a 
prosecutor may respond “fairly” to a claim made by defendant’s counsel, is 
problematic because a “fair response” could still be exactly the kind of 
comment the Fifth Amendment was adopted to prevent.115  According to 
Justice Marshall, the Court should have rejected these comments for 
violating the Fifth Amendment.116 
Only a handful of states have distinguished their state constitutions from 
this federal precedent when interpreting their state constitutions’ Fifth 
Amendment rights.  In Adams v. State,117 the Alaska Supreme Court placed 
a higher bar on what warrants a “fair response” from the prosecutor when 
calling attention to a defendant’s silence.118  The court denied the prosecutor 
protection under the fair response doctrine articulated in Robinson for two 
reasons:  (1) because the defense counsel did not expressly claim that the 
government denied the defendant the ability to tell his side of the story and 
(2) because the prosecutor did not expressly state he was responding to 
defense counsel’s express claims of the defendant’s inability to tell his side 
of the story.119 
The Alaska Supreme Court articulated that the fair response doctrine only 
affords prosecutors protection if the defense counsel and prosecutor are 
explicitly responding to one another’s remarks.120  Robinson did not require 
such an explicit indication of a response to defense counsel’s statements; 
thus, Alaska created a higher bar for a prosecutor to be granted protection for 
improper remarks under the fair response doctrine. 
A California appellate court has similarly elevated the fair response 
standard by requiring that the prosecutor’s comment be a “direct and fair 
response.”121  In State v. Ellsworth,122 the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
also held that, for a prosecutor to invoke the fair response doctrine when 
referencing a defendant’s failure to testify, defense counsel must have 
explicitly or implicitly referenced the defendant’s failure to testify.123  These 
state courts do not simply require a fair response as articulated in Robinson 
 
 113. Id. at 38 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 39. 
 115. Id. at 40. 
 116. Id. at 45. 
 117. 261 P.3d 758 (Alaska 2011). 
 118. See id. at 769. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 769–70. 
 121. People v. Diaz, 255 Cal. Rptr. 91, 97 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating, in a denial for a petition 
for rehearing, that the prosecutor’s comment must be a “direct and fair response” in order for 
a prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s silence to be excused). 
 122. 855 A.2d 474 (N.H. 2004). 
 123. See id. at 479. 
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but a direct and fair response for a prosecutor to successfully invoke this 
doctrine. 
Maryland explicitly declined to consider whether the fair response doctrine 
applies to a prosecutor’s comments on a defendant’s failure to testify.124  
Therefore, it has not yet decided if it will follow the Robinson Court’s ruling 
that a response need simply be “fair” to comment on a defendant’s silence or 
create a more exacting standard like those of Alaska, California, and New 
Hampshire.125  In the same opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals explicitly 
stated that, although article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is in 
pari materia126 with the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, it has 
been interpreted to confer more comprehensive self-incrimination rights than 
those of the federal Fifth Amendment.127  This statement seemingly 
references the court’s right to promulgate a more exacting standard than the 
U.S. Supreme Court promulgated for the fair response doctrine in Robinson. 
All other state courts with opinions on this issue have not departed from 
the federal holding, despite such a strong dissenting opinion from Justice 
Marshall about the eroding of a bright-line constitutional standard.128  Again, 
the state courts’ language shows there is a perceived higher persuasive bar to 
convince state courts to interpret their state constitutions and laws differently 
than the Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution.  For example, in 
Moore v. State,129 the Indiana Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that 
the Indiana Constitution is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution but nonetheless refused to promulgate a different standard 
on state constitutional grounds because the defendant supplied no “cogent 
argument” based on the Indiana Constitution.130  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, quoting Robinson extensively, summarily concluded that the 
fair response doctrine applied to its Fifth Amendment counterpart without 
any further state constitutional analysis.131 
In Wright v. State,132 the Mississippi Supreme Court overruled prior 
holdings that partially relied on its interpretations of U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent to interpret its own state constitution.133  It reasoned that, after the 
Robinson Court clarified prior Fifth Amendment doctrine, its prior holdings, 
relying on both the Mississippi Constitution and the federal Fifth 
Amendment protections, are overruled to the extent that they do not follow 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s fair response doctrine articulated in Robinson.134  
 
 124. Marshall v. State, 999 A.2d 1029, 1038 (Md. 2010). 
 125. See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text. 
 126. In pari materia means “in the same matter” in Latin. In pari materia, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 127. Marshall, 999 A.2d at 1035. 
 128. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 129. 669 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. 1996). 
 130. Id. at 739 n.14. 
 131. See Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 750 A.2d 243, 249–50 (Pa. 2000). 
 132. 958 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 2007). 
 133. See id. at 164. 
 134. Id. at 166 (overruling “Livingston and its progeny” since the Livingston court 
erroneously interpreted Supreme Court precedent, as clarified by Robinson). 
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The above examples demonstrate a state court pattern of seemingly blind 
“lockstepping” to Supreme Court precedent when it has promulgated an 
opinion on a prosecutorial summation issue.135  The next part contemplates 
the potential various state court motivations for this lockstepping, since state 
courts rarely provide their reasoning for following U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent. 
II.  STATE COURT MOTIVATIONS TO FOLLOW OR DIVERGE FROM U.S. 
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT  
As the language cited in Part I.B demonstrates, state courts do not 
explicitly acknowledge they are treating Supreme Court precedent differently 
than state court precedent when interpreting their state constitutions.  
However, beginning with the Burger Court retrenchments136 in the 1960s and 
1970s and continuing to today, scholars and judges have generated a large 
body of literature about whether state courts should continue this seemingly 
blind adherence of state precedent to federal precedent.137  Writers have 
devoted less attention to explaining why this convergence of state precedent 
and federal precedent continues to occur.138  This part outlines the competing 
motivations for why state courts may conform to federal precedent or, on the 
other hand, why state courts may rely on their own authority in the context 
of the American federalist system.  This Note suggests state courts’ 
motivations can be organized into the following four categories:  state 
constitutional interpretive methods, institutional legitimacy concerns, 
perceived Supreme Court expertise, and the promotion of efficiency through 
uniformity of federal and state case law. 
A.  Justifications for State Court Adherence to Federal Precedent 
Although state courts do not explicitly state why they choose to conform 
to U.S. Supreme Court precedent,139 they must have some motivations for 
doing so.  This section outlines the likely justifications for state court 
conformity to federal precedent, including federally focused constitutional 
interpretation methods, the perceived legitimacy garnered from reliance on 
 
 135. See SUTTON, supra note 10, at 174. 
 136. The Burger Court retrenchments are a series of cases promulgated by many Richard 
Nixon-appointed judges that resulted in conservative rulings in criminal procedure, equal 
protection, and First Amendment cases. See Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Burger Court and 
Freedom of Expression, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37, 37 (1976). 
 137. This body of literature began to expand with the addition of Justice William Brennan’s 
1977 article in the Harvard Law Review, titled State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).  The article is the ninth most-cited law review 
article of all time. Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights:  
A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2017).  Justice Stewart Pollock of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court called the article “the Magna Carta of state constitutional law.” Stewart 
G. Pollock, Address, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 
RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983). 
 138. Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 43 (2006). 
 139. See supra Part I.B. 
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federal precedent, Supreme Court constitutional expertise, and the values of 
uniformity and efficiency between federal and state law. 
1.  Interpretive Methods Amplifying the Influence of Federal Precedent 
The first explanation for state court conformity to federal precedent is that 
state court judges analyze state constitutions through a variety of interpretive 
methods that favor and emphasize federal court reasoning.  These 
interpretive methods begin with two assumptions:  first, that there is a 
relationship between the federal and state constitutions and second, that this 
relationship involves federal superiority over state precedent.  One such state 
constitutional interpretive approach is that state court judges perceive state 
constitutional language as derivative of the federal constitution, compelling 
state judges to look to federal courts for established interpretations.140  This 
occurs both where the federal constitutional language is identical to the state 
counterparts and, more surprisingly, where the state constitutional language 
differs from the federal language.141  Despite the differing state constitutional 
text, state courts still rely on U.S. Supreme Court precedent in construing 
their own state constitutions.142  By relying on federal precedent, state courts 
inherently ignore the intentions of the drafters of the state constitutions and 
the historical context in which they were drafted.143 
Another interpretive method that illustrates the state court view that the 
U.S. Supreme Court is more authoritative is the state courts’ application of 
certain criteria to determine if divergence from federal precedent is 
warranted.144  For example, the Washington Supreme Court uses a list of 
criteria that includes:  “(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; 
(3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; 
and (6) matters of particular state or local concern” to determine if it should 
diverge from federal precedent.145  The Illinois Supreme Court considers 
whether the language of its state constitution justifies a departure from 
federal precedent.146  The Supreme Court of California states that 
“[d]ecisions of the United States Supreme Court . . . are entitled to respectful 
consideration . . . and ought to be followed unless persuasive reasons are 
presented for taking a different course.”147  The Supreme Courts of New 
 
 140. See GARDNER, supra note 4, at 6–7; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 146–50. 
 141. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 6–8 (providing examples from the Massachusetts and 
Virginia state courts). 
 142. Id. at 8–9. 
 143. Id. at 9. 
 144. See Liu, supra note 137, at 1314. 
 145. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986) (en banc). 
 146. People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 157 (Ill. 1984) (stating that the court will consider 
“the language of our constitution, or in the debates and the committee reports of the 
constitutional convention” when determining if there is a valid justification to depart from 
federal precedent). 
 147. People v. Teresinski, 640 P.2d 753, 761 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (citations omitted). 
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Jersey,148 Connecticut,149 and Pennsylvania150 have similar criteria when 
deciding whether or not to diverge from federal precedent.  These approaches 
all treat federal precedent with a presumptive correctness that dilutes the 
validity of original state court reasoning.151 
These methods of state constitutional interpretation are amplified because 
it is easier for state judges and their law clerks to research and adhere to 
federal precedent.152  Law clerks often graduate from elite law schools that 
are focused on federal law.153  When state court law clerks have only been 
exposed to federal case law, they bring a federal bias to their writing and 
research that reinforces a natural tendency toward federal precedent.154  
Additionally, there is a dearth of secondary sources about state constitutional 
law developments and a plethora of secondary sources on federal 
constitutional law.155  This imbalance in research resources continues to 
skew state judicial clerks and judges toward federal case law.156 
2.  State Court Judges Rely on Federal Precedent to Garner Legitimacy 
A second explanation for state court conformity to federal precedent is that 
state court judges are concerned about their perceived legitimacy among the 
public.157  Many state court judges are elected or selected to the bench for a 
set term,158 unlike the federal judiciary, which is nominated for life.159  There 
is evidence that judges and scholars perceive state case law as inferior to 
federal case law.  The idea of state court inferiority to federal courts has long 
been a sentiment in American government and among the American 
public.160  In 1988, a national poll found 52 percent of adults did not know 
their state had a constitution at all.161  Academic writings and the media 
contribute to this image of state courts.162  “A quick glance at legal literature 
 
 148. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955–57 (N.J. 1982) (“Sound policy reasons, however, 
may justify a departure.”). 
 149. State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232–34 (Conn. 1992) (listing federal precedent as a 
tool of analysis in interpreting the state constitution). 
 150. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) (explaining that federal 
decisions should be given due weight in state constitutional analysis when they are well 
reasoned). 
 151. See Liu, supra note 137, at 1314–15. 
 152. Charles G. Douglas III, State Judicial Activism—the New Role for State Bills of Rights, 
12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123, 1137 (1978). 
 153. Id. at 1147. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Aldisert, supra note 5, at 558 (describing “unfortunate language, disparaging our 
state judges”). 
 158. See MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 180–81. 
 159. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 160. Aldisert, supra note 5, at 557–58; see also GARDNER, supra note 4, at 24 (stating 
“rulings of state supreme courts are generally poorly understood and poorly covered by the 
media” and “lawyers . . . have traditionally been extremely reluctant even to raise state 
constitutional issues or, upon raising them, to brief them thoroughly”). 
 161. SUTTON, supra note 10, at 194. 
 162. Aldisert, supra note 5, at 559. 
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suggests there is no important litigation except cases interpreting federal 
statutes or the federal constitution.”163  Out of approximately 200 accredited 
and unaccredited law schools in the United States, only twenty-eight taught 
a state constitutional law course in 2016.164  The media constantly highlights 
state court shortcomings, which provides the American public with the 
impression that state courts are less legitimate than their federal 
counterparts.165 
Thus, state court judges seek to derive legitimacy from citing to their 
federal counterparts that are more influential in scholarship and in the 
media.166  State courts often inject federal authority into their decisions even 
though only state law is at issue.167  By injecting federal law into a case, the 
state court gives the federal judiciary the potential jurisdiction to decide the 
claim, since the state court’s holding is no longer predicated on an “adequate 
and independent” state ground.168  State courts and state legislatures are 
happy to have federal court precedent resolve controversial policy issues to 
avoid making unpopular decisions.169  Some argue that state judges abdicate 
their duty to solve these traditionally localized problems in a charged political 
climate.170 
Ensuring legitimacy by citing federal precedent in state court opinions 
dealing with state law may also be spurred by the expansion of the federal 
government, national political parties, and national lobbies, which have 
created a “homogenizing influence on our political and cultural identity.”171  
In today’s society, most people see themselves first as American citizens and 
second as citizens of the states in which they reside.172  Indeed, under the 
Citizenship Clause in the U.S. Constitution, a person cannot be a citizen of a 
state without also being a citizen of the United States.173 
These perceptions of federal identity may also make it harder for state 
courts to confidently rely on their states’ unique history, values, and character 
to justify nonconformity with the U.S. Constitution, especially in situations 
where the state and federal constitutional language are exactly the same.174  
When judges and citizens cannot distinguish a state’s identity from the 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. SUTTON, supra note 10, at 194–95. 
 165. Aldisert, supra note 5, at 559. 
 166. See GARDNER, supra note 4, at 23–24. 
 167. Douglas, supra note 152, at 1143; see also MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 42. 
 168. MARKS & COOPER, supra note 6, at 38.  The Supreme Court formally stated this 
doctrine in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874).  It was later revised in Michigan 
v. Long, where the Supreme Court developed the “plain statement rule,” which presumes that 
when a state court relies on both federal and state law, the decision is based on federal law 
unless the opinion includes a clear statement to the contrary. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1040–41 (1983). 
 169. Aldisert, supra note 5, at 562. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Liu, supra note 137, at 1327. 
 172. See id. 
 173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 174. See Liu, supra note 137, at 1328. 
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identity of the country as a whole, they may feel they lack a legitimate basis 
on which to diverge from federal interpretations of constitutional language. 
The distinctiveness of state history, values, and character has significantly 
diminished from the time of the Framers.  Understanding states as a unified 
community with common values can be seen as “silly” and “pointless,” 
because state identity is a thing of the past.175  What used to be fundamental 
principles consistent with the origins and evolutions of particular states are 
now understood as “transcendent American principles,” and state courts treat 
them as such.176 
3.  State Courts Expect U.S. Supreme Court Justices to Be More 
Authoritative on Constitutional Issues 
A third explanation for state court conformity to federal precedent is that 
state courts may presume the U.S. Supreme Court Justices are more 
authoritative on constitutional issues than they are.177  This belief compels 
state court judges to view the Supreme Court’s reasoning as presumptively 
correct.  It is well known that the Supreme Court’s main focus is 
constitutional jurisprudence.178  The prevalence of constitutional 
interpretation in the Supreme Court’s everyday institutional role may shape 
state court judges’ perceptions that the Supreme Court has constitutional 
resources and expertise that make it more authoritative on any given 
constitutional interpretation issue.  State courts’ deferential language when 
conforming to Supreme Court precedent illustrates this state court 
presumption.179 
Moreover, when state courts choose to depart from Supreme Court 
precedent, they still illustrate this presumption because state courts have a 
tendency to conform to the reasoning of a Supreme Court dissenting opinion 
when rejecting the majority opinion.180  For example, after the Supreme 
Court ruled that prosecutors may always argue on summation that a 
defendant tailored testimony to the evidence presented at trial,181 most state 
courts followed this holding.182  However, even the handful of states that did 
not adopt this holding simply conformed to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in that 
case.183  Of the states that interpreted their state constitutions differently than 
the Supreme Court interpreted the U.S. Constitution in Agard, only New 
 
 175. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 393. 
 176. Liu, supra note 137, at 1328. 
 177. See id. at 1314–15 (explaining that certain interpretive approaches treat federal 
precedent as presumptively correct). 
 178. See Aldisert, supra note 5, at 560. 
 179. See supra Part I.B. 
 180. See supra Part I.B.1.  A different conclusion may be reached when examining a 
different subset of cases than those presented in this Note. 
 181. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 65 (2000). 
 182. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 183. See supra Part I.B.1.  Massachusetts, Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, and New Jersey 
are the five states that have not conformed to the majority opinion. 
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Jersey did not explicitly conform to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.184  The 
Hawaii Supreme Court cites Justice Ginsburg’s dissent dozens of times in its 
decision regarding this prosecutorial summation issue.185  The Hawaii 
Supreme Court praises the dissenting opinion for its apt observations and 
explicitly states its agreement with and adoption of the reasoning.186  Thus, 
it seems that when the U.S. Supreme Court rules on a prosecutorial 
summation issue, the state courts narrow their reasoning to three options:  the 
Supreme Court’s majority, concurrence, or dissent.  This adherence to some 
Supreme Court reasoning illustrates the perceived authority of the Supreme 
Court Justices’ in the eyes of state court judges. 
4.  Uniformity Between Federal and State Law Promotes Efficiency 
A fourth explanation for state court conformity to federal precedent is that 
state court judges value uniformity across state and federal jurisdictions, 
especially in the realm of criminal procedure.187  “Vertical uniformity has 
been a particular concern in the area of criminal procedure, where courts have 
expressed concern about the costs and inefficiencies that disuniformity could 
impose on federal and state law enforcement officers.”188  Simplicity and 
predictability are often important considerations in the judicial decision-
making process.189 
Courts are worried about creating two sets of rules in criminal procedure, 
which could produce confusion among judges, lawyers, and law 
enforcement.190  Although state courts explicitly weigh notions of federalism 
against uniformity, the value of uniformity appears to be more compelling in 
the criminal procedure context.191  “Divergent interpretations are 
unsatisfactory . . . particularly where . . . the federal and state provisions are 
the same.”192  Additionally, this vertical uniformity has long been considered 
a jurisprudential virtue that prevents against forum shopping.193 
As a practical matter, it is much easier for state courts to conform to federal 
court precedent than for federal courts to conform to various state court 
precedents.  Once the U.S. Supreme Court promulgates an opinion, all federal 
 
 184. In State v. Daniels, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting 
opinion but did not follow its central tenant. State v. Daniels, 861 A.2d 808, 820 (N.J. 2004).  
Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that prosecutors are never allowed to comment 
on a defendant’s presence in the courtroom when making tailoring accusations. Id. at 819. 
 185. State v. Mattson, 226 P.3d 482, 493–98, 506, 508, 511–13 (Haw. 2010). 
 186. See id. at 495–96. 
 187. See Liu, supra note 137, at 1333. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1334. 
 190. State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 516 (Iowa 2014) (Waterman, J., dissenting); see also 
McCrory v. State, 342 So. 2d 897, 900 (Miss. 1977) (en banc); State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 
1202, 1209 (Or. 1974) (en banc); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, 
Associate C.J., concurring). 
 191. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J. 1982). 
 192. Id. (arguing for the application of uniform rules governing search and seizure issues). 
 193. Liu, supra note 137, at 1334. 
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courts across the country must follow this precedent.194  However, when a 
state supreme court promulgates an opinion, it is only binding on the lower 
courts in its own state.195  Therefore, it is much more convenient for all state 
courts to conform to one unified federal precedent than it is for the federal 
courts to pick one state holding to adhere to and wait for the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s approval.  The dual forces of efficiency and uniformity can explain 
state courts’ tendencies to conform to federal precedent in the criminal 
procedure context. 
B.  Justifications for State Court Independence from Federal Precedent 
Despite the clear patterns of state court behavior illustrated in Part I.B, 
there are many reasons why state courts should not readily conform to federal 
precedent.  Many of these considerations directly undermine the theories and 
assumptions underlying the state court motivations outlined in Part II.A.  
State court behavior in relation to U.S. Supreme Court precedent would likely 
be different if state courts relied on competing considerations, including 
state-specific constitutional interpretative methods, legitimacy garnered from 
the inherent authority conferred on all state courts, state courts’ 
overwhelming experience with criminal trial procedure, and the need for 
laws tailored to the specific concerns and culture of a jurisdiction. 
1.  Interpretive Methods Focusing on the State-Specific Context 
The first justification for state court independence from federal precedent 
is that some state court judges analyze their constitutions using interpretive 
methods that emphasize state history and culture.  Although some state courts 
may see their constitutions as derivatives of the U.S. Constitution, the 
language of the U.S. Constitution was at least partially derived from various 
state sources.196  The Framers did not develop the concept of a modern, 
written constitution; instead, drafters of the former American colonies 
developed written constitutions eleven years before the Constitutional 
Convention.197  Although this relationship may again suggest convergence, 
it could also suggest that the hierarchy should be flipped, in that the U.S. 
Supreme Court should be looking to the states as a superior source of 
constitutional interpretation, instead of the opposite.198 
When the Committee of Detail199 began to write the first draft of the U.S. 
Constitution in the summer of 1787, its members gathered materials they 
thought may have language from which they could borrow.200  These 
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materials included the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia and New 
Jersey Plans, and several state constitutions.201  Additionally, when the 
federal Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution in 1791, most of its 
language was borrowed from existing state constitutions, particularly the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights.202 
Dating as far back as 1641, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties provided 
for due process, jury trials, and double jeopardy protections.203  In 1776, the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights provided, “a man hath a right to demand the 
cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted by the accusers and 
witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour, and to a speedy trial by an 
impartial jury.”204  The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
incorporates much of this language.205  The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, one of the oldest governing constitutions 
in the world, established in 1780, provides language similar to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, stating, “[e]ach individual of the society 
has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and 
property, according to standing laws.”206 
Additionally, most state constitutions have either been amended or 
completely replaced in recent years, so their texts have different interpretive 
historical contexts than the U.S. Constitution, drafted in 1787.207  Given the 
ease with which states can amend their constitutions, state constitutional 
language is often much longer and broader in scope than the U.S. 
Constitution.208  Because different pieces of state constitutional text were 
drafted and added in nearly every period of American history, the interpretive 
methods relevant to the U.S. Constitution’s historical context have no 
applicability to much of the state constitutional language drafted in very 
different periods of American history.209 
The fact that the federal constitutional language was derived from the 
states should reinforce state courts’ influence and authority when interpreting 
their own state constitutional language amidst federal precedent.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court, which has often looked to state court reasoning when 
deciding certain criminal procedure issues, reinforces this idea.210 
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2.  State Courts Derive Legitimacy from Their Inherent Authority 
A second justification for state court independence from federal precedent 
is that state court authority is derived completely separately from federal 
court authority.  Not only do state courts have nearly plenary power to 
interpret their state constitutions with limited oversight from federal 
courts,211 they also have an inherent authority stemming from 
subconstitutional common-law doctrine.212  State courts, like their federal 
counterparts, have inherent common-law authority to promulgate state rules 
of procedure, evidence, and substance.213  The inherent power to enforce 
standards of procedure can be used broadly to achieve the interests of 
justice.214  State court power is at its peak in state criminal trials. 
In Federalist No. 45, James Madison explained that the powers of the 
states “extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”215  The state is the 
repository of all inherent power and can delegate that power to its various 
branches of government.216  Most often, this inherent power to conclusively 
interpret a state’s constitution is delegated to the court of last resort.217  This 
power is completely separate from the U.S. Constitution’s express grant of 
power to the Supreme Court for constitutional interpretation.218  Therefore, 
there is no legal need under the American federalist system for state courts 
to derive any legitimacy from federal precedent. 
However, there are several reasons that many state courts use their inherent 
power “sparingly.”219  Instead of making decisions grounded in state 
constitutions, inherent power allows courts to make decisions in the “spirit 
of the [state’s] Constitution.”220  Therefore, reliance on inherent power often 
lacks the same legitimacy when invoked as an explicit justification for 
fashioning a judicial rule or remedy.221  Regardless of whether a court 
explicitly invokes inherent authority, state courts can impose new rules based 
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on considerations of justice, fair dealing, and standards of decency.222  These 
powers are firmly grounded in state courts’ historic equitable powers and do 
not need legal bolstering by federal precedent.223 
3.  State Court Judges Have More Exposure to Criminal Trials  
A third justification for state court independence from federal precedent in 
the state criminal procedure context is that state courts oversee the vast 
majority of criminal trials.  Although some state court judges may perceive 
the Supreme Court as having superior knowledge of constitutional issues,224 
this is simply not the case regarding criminal trial procedure, including 
prosecutorial summation issues.  The federal courts only process 3 percent of 
all felony prosecutions and under 1 percent of all misdemeanor 
prosecutions.225  Since state courts process the vast majority of criminal 
trials, they are better positioned to assess issues with the process and the 
consequences of those issues.  State courts are more exposed to criminal trial 
procedure, even though the Supreme Court may be more experienced in 
constitutional interpretation.226 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has acknowledged state court expertise 
in several areas of the law by using state court reasoning to inform its 
decisions about federal constitutional interpretation.227  An accumulation of 
state court holdings that deviate from federal precedent can spur the Supreme 
Court to reconsider that particular issue.228  The Supreme Court has 
previously adopted state court analysis in six key areas:  judicial review, 
substantive due process, freedom of speech and religion, eminent domain, 
the right to bear arms, and the rights of the accused.229  With regard to 
criminal procedure specifically, the state courts have anticipated and 
influenced Supreme Court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution on the 
right to counsel, the right to appeal, and the exclusionary rule.230  For 
example, in Faretta v. California,231 the Supreme Court justified its holding 
that a defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation by citing to 
thirty-six state constitutions that explicitly provide for this right.232  The 
Supreme Court also reasoned that many state courts had already expressed 
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the view that the U.S. Constitution supports the right to self-representation in 
a criminal trial.233  This shows that state courts have the expertise to decide 
issues of criminal trial procedure.  State courts have made valuable 
contributions to federal constitutional law through their independent 
interpretations of state constitutions.234 
4.  The Value of Uniformity Is Outweighed by the Need for State-Specific 
Laws 
A fourth justification for state court independence from federal precedent 
is the need for particularized rules tailored to a jurisdiction’s specific 
demands and culture.  The interest of federal-state uniformity may be one 
consideration in a court’s analysis, but it should not be the deciding factor.235  
State courts have a duty to use their authority to oversee and shape state 
criminal trial procedures that protect individual rights.236 
“[S]tate courts do not have to consider the national implications of their 
decisions.  They need only reach the best decisions for their own 
communities.”237  Although it can be argued the specific cultures of states 
have eroded due to the rise of a stronger national government,238 there are 
many state-specific considerations that should be contemplated when 
interpreting state constitutional language.  For example, Alaskan “character” 
is based on values of independence, self-reliance, and individualism, and the 
framers of Alaska’s constitution likely shared these values.239  Thus, the 
Alaskan judiciary has interpreted certain state rights to be broader than their 
federal counterparts by emphasizing the value of liberty in Alaskan society 
as stronger than the value of liberty in American society generally.240 
Another example of prevalent state-specific considerations is Georgia’s 
focus on the central role of the family and the promotion of certain 
community moral standards through state law.241  These standards are meant 
to protect Georgia’s character in the broader American society and stem from 
its experience with federal control after the Civil War.242  Finally, Vermont’s 
history of pragmatism and republicanism and its heightened deference to 
local government may shape the state judiciary’s interpretation of certain 
clauses of its constitution.243 
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State courts have a duty to weigh these local needs against the value of 
uniformity of state and federal case law.  The very purpose of state court 
authority and state constitutional history is wasted when state courts blindly 
conform to federal precedent, especially in the highly localized area of 
criminal trial procedure. 
III.  STATE COURTS SHOULD NOT OVEREMPHASIZE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT REGARDING PROSECUTORIAL SUMMATIONS 
Despite the numerous, and often competing, considerations behind state 
court adherence to federal precedent illustrated in Part II, state courts should 
nevertheless only give U.S. Supreme Court decisions the same persuasive 
weight as those of sister state courts, especially in the realm of prosecutorial 
summation arguments.  Ultimately, “each tribunal is supreme in its own field, 
and in the final analysis neither can do the other’s job.”244 
State courts should not feel compelled to adhere to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution regarding prosecutorial 
summation issues for several reasons.  First, state constitutional interpretative 
methods based on the presumption of federal superiority are inconsistent with 
the federalist structure the Framers intended.  Second, state courts should 
ground their institutional legitimacy soundly in their own inherent powers 
and precedent instead of in Supreme Court precedent.  Third, state courts 
have more exposure to and experience with criminal trials than federal courts, 
thus the perception that the Supreme Court is more authoritative in the realm 
of prosecutorial summation arguments is unfounded.  Fourth, the values of 
uniformity and convergence of state and federal law are outweighed by the 
need for state-specific criminal trial procedure that is tailored to the needs of 
each jurisdiction for prosecutorial summation issues. 
A.  State Courts Should Emphasize State History and Context  
To give state constitutional language its intended meaning, state courts 
must utilize state constitutional history and context when interpreting state 
constitutional provisions.  Analyzing the historical context and the intentions 
of the framers of the state constitutions is the only way to give state 
constitutional language its true meaning and effect.  When judges interpret 
the U.S. Constitution, they often look to the historical context and the 
Framers’ intentions.245  They use records from the Constitutional Convention 
and The Federalist Papers to interpret the federal constitutional language 
because the document is a product of the late eighteenth century.246  Yet, 
when state judges interpret state constitutions, there is rarely any discussion 
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of the drafters’ intentions or the historical context in which the language was 
adopted.247 
Using interpretive methods that take into account the state-specific context 
of the constitutional language is especially important for state constitutions 
because state constitutions are easier to amend and more specific than the 
U.S. Constitution.248  Therefore, while most of the federal constitutional text 
embodies the ideas of one generation at a specific point in American history, 
many state constitutions reflect the intentions of various generations.249  For 
example, many state constitutions contain language that directly addresses 
the prominent problem of government debt that arose in the mid-nineteenth 
century after states overspent on infrastructure in response to the Industrial 
Revolution.250  These provisions should be interpreted differently than the 
provisions adopted by some states a century later, in response to the Great 
Depression, that provide for “aid, care and support of the needy.”251 
State courts that use the “criteria method” should pay particular attention 
to the state-specific context of their constitutional language.  The criteria 
approach automatically frames federal precedent as presumptively correct.252  
Although the criteria method often explicitly contemplates “constitutional 
history” and “matters of particular state or local concern,”253 the presumptive 
correctness of federal precedent remains problematic.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holdings surely deserve respect, especially when they provide 
insights into the origins of federal constitutional language.  However, the 
U.S. Supreme Court should not be presumed correct when its ruling is based 
“only [on] a contemporary ‘balance’ of pragmatic considerations about 
which reasonable people may differ over time and among the several 
states.”254 
This focus on state-specific interpretive methods is applicable even when 
the federal and state constitutional language is identical.  State-specific 
concerns can result in different interpretations of constitutional formulations, 
such as “reasonableness,” fairness, or directness in the context of 
prosecutorial summation rules.255  State supreme court judges’ views of these 
amorphous constitutional concepts within their own states’ social and 
political contexts are just as valid as those of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
in the context of the federal government.256 
The “‘balance’ of pragmatic considerations about which reasonable people 
may differ”257 is especially prominent in the prosecutorial summation 
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context.  The rules of prosecutorial summations often involve weighing the 
protections of the accused against the need for the prosecutor to argue and 
inquire about aspects of the defendant’s case.258  The balance that must be 
struck between both parties should involve a state-specific analysis because 
the vague constitutional constructs at the core of criminal trial procedure may 
be interpreted differently based on reasonable interpretations of 
constitutional language and constitutional contexts.  This is especially true 
since the Supreme Court often calls on state courts to afford different rights 
to their citizens on state law grounds with respect to criminal trial 
procedure.259  State court judges should use state-specific constitutional 
interpretation methods to give each state’s constitution its full intended 
meaning, especially when analyzing prosecutorial summation issues. 
B.  State Court Legitimacy Through Broad Inherent Authority  
“[S]tate governments possess all inherent power necessary to govern.”260  
This is especially true in the prosecutorial summation context, where state 
courts have the authority to promulgate rules of procedure, evidence, and 
substance.261  This authority should not be wasted by simply adhering to 
Supreme Court precedent.  It should be used broadly to achieve the interests 
of justice in accordance with the needs and customs of a specific 
jurisdiction.262 
Legitimacy is an urgent concern for state judges, especially since many 
face reelection.263  It is true that the media and academia focus on and glorify 
the federal judiciary, while underrepresenting the state judiciary and 
emphasizing its shortcomings.264  However, if the state judiciary continues 
to derive its legitimacy by relying on the federal judiciary, it will never gain 
the legitimacy it legally possesses in its own right.265  State judges’ reliance 
on federal precedent further reinforces the supremacy of the federal judiciary 
in the eyes of the public.  State court judges who rely on federal court 
precedent reinforce the idea that the federal courts somehow control state 
court analysis and reasoning.  This is simply not the case in the realm of state 
constitutional jurisprudence, especially for rulings related to prosecutorial 
summation issues. 
Even if state courts feel compelled to rely on other precedent or 
interpretation to bolster their own reasoning, it would make more sense for 
them to rely on sister state court cases than federal precedent.266  Sister state 
courts will have similar exposure to prosecutorial summation issues and are 
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more likely to share linguistic and historical roots than the U.S. 
Constitution.267  Additionally, these state courts consider a similar 
geographic area, as opposed to the Supreme Court, which considers 
constitutional interpretation on a national level.268  This interstate reliance on 
sister state courts would also bolster state court legitimacy, since relying on 
each other’s authority would reinforce the integrity and validity of the state 
judiciary as a whole. 
State court judges specifically have the power to create local rules and 
practice guides prioritizing or informing the legal community about state law 
claims.269  The Oregon State Bar has already promulgated a state 
constitutional law practice guide that two state court judges and three 
practitioners wrote.270  Similar initiatives can help members of the bar realize 
the independent role state constitutional law can play in representing their 
clients.271  This prioritization could help to create a more robust state 
constitutional law jurisprudence, which would help the state judiciary garner 
more attention in academia and the media, thus bolstering its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public. 
The structure of the American federalist system was specifically designed 
so that state courts may enjoy some degree of independence from the federal 
judiciary.272  Although there is some debate as to whether states should be 
seen as independent “laborator[ies]”273 or as “part of the same general 
research institution,”274 the concept of some level of independence is 
maintained.  The Framers would not have made such an effort to delineate 
the powers of the state and federal governments if they were not meant to be 
separate institutions.  The foundational organization of the American 
judiciary reinforces state courts’ legitimacy through their inherent authority. 
C.  State Court Exposure to Prosecutorial Summations 
Prosecutorial summation speeches are overwhelmingly an aspect of 
criminal trial procedure specific to state trial courts.275  Yet, it is evident from 
state court language that state judges presume the Supreme Court Justices are 
more authoritative on constitutional interpretation regarding prosecutorial 
summation issues than state court judges are.276  Although the Supreme 
Court’s main focus is constitutional jurisprudence,277 state courts are better 
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equipped to interpret their constitutional language in the context of 
prosecutorial summation issues. 
Based on the sheer volume of criminal cases, the state courts are better 
equipped to evaluate the various considerations at play in prosecutorial 
summation issues.  The state courts handle approximately 97 percent of all 
felony cases and approximately 99 percent of all misdemeanor cases.278  This 
means that state court judges are significantly more exposed to the effects of 
their rulings and the policies that they impose.  This exposure makes for more 
informed policy that is tailored to a jurisdiction’s specific needs based on 
state court judges’ everyday experience in the courtroom.  Although the U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices may have more experience in interpreting open-
ended constitutional language such as “reasonableness,” state courts have 
more experience with the actual procedure in which the interpretation of 
constitutional language concerning prosecutorial summation issues must be 
grounded.279  When state judges blindly apply federal precedent to state law 
prosecutorial summation issues, they are eschewing the wealth of knowledge 
amassed through their extensive criminal trial procedure experience.  
Furthermore, the underlying reasoning behind federal court precedent may 
be totally at odds with the various policy considerations at play in state court 
prosecutorial summation issues. 
The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the superiority of state court 
experience with criminal trial procedure in the past by quoting state court 
cases in justifying its own constitutional interpretations.280  The Supreme 
Court has also changed its own ruling when an accumulation of state court 
constitutional interpretations departed from the federal precedent.281  This 
shows that state court judges should view the interaction between the state 
and federal judiciaries as a dialogue instead of a monologue of marching 
orders that the U.S. Supreme Court dictates to the states.282  This dialogue is 
especially important in the prosecutorial summation context where state 
courts have more exposure to the subject matter than federal courts.  
Silencing this dialogue is detrimental to the development of both state and 
federal constitutional interpretation. 
D.  The Need for State-Specific Criminal Trial Procedure 
Judicial efficiency through legal uniformity is an important consideration 
in the criminal procedure context for many judges in the American 
judiciary.283  However, federal-state uniformity should not be an influential 
factor in the prosecutorial summation context for several reasons. 
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First, prosecutors are only required to adhere to the rules of the jurisdiction 
to which they are assigned to practice.284  Thus, the idea that disuniformity 
would create inefficiencies between federal and state authorities does not 
apply to the prosecutorial summation context.285  A prosecutor will be 
appearing in either state or federal court, never both.  This gives state courts 
all the more license to tailor prosecutorial summation rules specifically to 
their particular jurisdictions’ needs and culture because prosecutors will not 
be concerned about other jurisdictions’ rules in their everyday practices.  
There will be no confusion about which rules apply to federal and state law 
enforcement officers, as may be the case in other areas of criminal trial 
procedure.286 
Second, although there is some question about the extent to which states 
have different cultures and concerns in an era of emphasis on national 
citizenship and culture,287 there is a need for particularized criminal trial 
procedure based on the unique customs and challenges that apply to certain 
states and jurisdictions.  The unique cultural aspects of liberal states like 
Alaska or conservative states like Georgia should have judiciaries that 
interpret their state constitutions in the context of those cultures.288 
Liberal versus conservative considerations are not the only distinctions to 
be made among state cultures.  Hawaii’s multiethnic heritage,289 Louisiana’s 
constitutional patriarchy,290 and Wyoming’s communitarian ideals291 all 
should influence the way state court judges analyze and construct different 
prosecutorial summation rules.  Although not all states will have such starkly 
differing cultures, at the very least, different regions of the country have 
different historical foundations, requiring state courts to prioritize specialized 
rules over uniformity.  To ignore the cultural ethos of a state in the context 
of prosecutorial summation issues is to ignore the differing values and 
historical foundations that shaped the creation of each state’s constitution.  
Unlike other areas of criminal procedure that may involve the interaction 
between federal and state officials, there is no such justification in the 
prosecutorial summation context. 
CONCLUSION 
State courts should refrain from allowing the Supreme Court to loom large 
in prosecutorial summation jurisprudence when state courts are better 
equipped to make decisions on these issues.  State court judges should utilize 
state-specific constitutional interpretation methods when interpreting state 
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criminal procedure context). 
 286. Liu, supra note 137, at 1333–34. 
 287. See id. at 1327. 
 288. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 289. MCHUGH, supra note 239, at 107–34. 
 290. Id. at 135–60. 
 291. Id. at 221–48. 
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constitutions, instead of relying on constitutional interpretation methods that 
begin by presuming federal constitutional interpretations are applicable and 
correct.  State courts possess the inherent authority to rule independently on 
state criminal trial procedure and needlessly relying on federal precedent 
only undermines their legitimacy.  Logistically, state courts have 
significantly more exposure to criminal trial procedure because they handle 
the vast majority of criminal cases.  Although convergence and uniformity 
between federal and state rules may be justified for other criminal trial 
procedure topics, here, in the context of prosecutorial summations, there is 
no reason for state courts to adhere to federal precedent.  U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent can be used as instructive reasoning for state court judges, but its 
influence should not be heightened any further. 
